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The Institutionalization of Conflict
in the Reform of Schools:
A Case Study of Court Implementation
of the PARC Decreet
JANET ROSENBERG*
WILLIAM R. F. PHILLIPS**

For the past four years Judge Edward R. Becker, sitting on the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, has been
negotiating the disputes among the parties involved in the implementation of the decree in PennsylvaniaAssociationfor Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania.' The decree is based on a consent agreement growing out
of a class action suit brought by the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children (PARC) against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and defendant school districts. The suit was brought on behalf of those retarded
children excluded from the public schools because of their presumed inability to benefit from an education.'
The case is representative of a growing number of class actions that
have come to the federal courts in the past three decades. The plaintiffs
in these cases are frequently members of what commentators call
unprepossessing groups, such as minorities, mental patients, prisoners
and the handicapped, who experience exclusion, deprivation, or some form
of differential and unfair treatment.3 As in the benchmark case of Brown
v. Board of Education,4 these groups ask the court to change the practices of a public bureaucracy whose operations allegedly result in the denial
of their constitutional rights.
During the past twenty-five years the number of cases calling for institutional remediation has increased. The expansion of state functions, the

T An earlier version of this paper was presented in August 1981 at the American
Sociological Association meetings in Toronto, Canada. The authors wish to express their
appreciation to Allen I. Rosenberg for his support and useful suggestions on the first draft
and subsequent revisions of this paper, and to Judge Edward R. Becker, United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, formerly sitting on the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and his staff, for their assistance in the search
for relevant public documents.
* B.A. 1968, M.A. 1969, Ph.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania. Associate Professor
of Sociology, Widener University.
** B.A. 1962, Stanford University; M.A. 1965, Ph.D. 1970, University of Wisconsin.

Associate Professor of Sociology, Widener University.
1 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), approved and adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972) [hereinafter cited as PARC v. Pennsylvania].

SId.
Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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efforts of minorities to secure their rights, the consequent widening of
the umbrella of equal protection through the courts and acts of Congress
as well as the relaxation of procedural requirements for bringing class
actions have all contributed to the rise of such cases.' Despite the considerable success of the federal courts in establishing the constitutional rights
of the disadvantaged, their efforts to reform institutions on the basis of
court orders have been less successful." Even when legislation has subsequently reinforced and clarified the original judicial mandates, institutional reform has not necessarily resulted.'
Suits involving institutional reform have presented the federal judiciary
with a variety of problems.8 Aside from substantive and procedural legal
issues and the tension between judicial restraint and judicial activism,9
concerns beyond the scope of this article, these suits have raised two
important questions: first, how can judicial remedies be designed to resolve
what are essentially political disputes? And second, how can courts with
limited resources and a narrow range of effective sanctions enforce their
decisions on intractable bureaucracies? These questions are not concerned with whether the federal courts should intervene in cases of institutional reform, but with their capacity to do so and with the effects of
their efforts on the remedial process.
The formulation of appropriate remedies in such cases is highly
problematic because they differ markedly from those applicable in traditional private litigation, in which the means of resolving the dispute are
clearly determinable. In such traditional private cases the court may require one party to give financial restitution to the other or, based on an
evaluation of a set of completed events, may order one party to stop some
action or form of behavior that it determines is unfair or injurious. In
the remediation of institutions, however, a successful remedy is more
elusive. In these cases the court is generally being asked to compel an

' Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Judicial In-

volvement, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 117 (1977).
For discussions of the problems of implementing court ordered remediation in a variety
of institutions, see J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);
Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES (V.
Bradley & G. Clark eds. 1976); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree
Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
' Despite the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. SS 1411-20
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the detailed regulations of the Office of Special Education
and Rehabilitation Services, 34 C.F.R. SS 300.1-.754 (1980), which contain detailed regulations for educational programs for the handicapped, there has been virtually uninterrupted
litigation under the PARC case and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
1 For discussions of the full range of problems, see Special Project, The Remedial Process in InstitutionalReform Litigation,78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978); Note, Implementation
Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977).
' These problems were recently analyzed by Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 TermForeward:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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organization to do something it is not presently doing. The relief sought
might be a guarantee of equal educational opportunities where discrimination exists, as in Brown v. Board of Education," or the structuring of
adequate institutional care where, as claimed by the plaintiffs in the
Willowbrook case, neglect and deprivation predominate." Frequently, to
accomplish these results, the offending organizations must make extensive changes in their practices, their personnel, and the disposition of
their resources. The court is being called upon to perform legislative functions as it attempts to control a complex series of future acts in anticipation of their outcomes. 2 The court's departure from its customary adjudicatory function is complicated by the lack of consensus concerning
precisely what institutional changes will achieve the ends sought by the
aggrieved parties. In most cases, defendants, plaintiffs, and independent
experts are likely to hold differing views regarding the facts to be considered and precisely what actions will comply with a legislative act or
a judicial decision.
The courts must formulate decisions predicated on social rather than
historical facts, on anticipated rather than past events. In many cases,
however, the ability of the courts to collect the pertinent data, the capacity
of the judge to interpret it, and the suitability of the collected facts as
reliable and valid predictors of social processes are all questionable. 3 Further, to the extent that the courts in prescribing a remedy must provide
substantive definitions of abstract terms such as "adequate treatment"
or "appropriate education" when no agreed upon standards exist, they
are being asked to choose among competing theories and values. Nevertheless, because the claims of disadvantaged groups have had relatively
broad support in the polity and because they have been able to establish
their rights through the courts and the legislative process, judges have
been drawn into more activist roles. It is not uncommon for a set of orders
to consist of eighty-four standards to guide organizational practice or
twenty-nine pages of instructions covering twenty-three areas of
operation." When remedies require such complex orders, courts must
maintain jurisdiction over the case and find mechanisms for supervising
the implementation of those orders. Consequently, their involvement with
the case is prolonged and deepened. 5
,o 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 409 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y.
(1976), furtherimplementing the consentjudgment, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (popularly
known as the Willowbrook case).
'I Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
' D. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 47-56, 274-76, 282-83.
" For a discussion of orders in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
and New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 409 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), further implementing the consent judgment, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), and the
difficulties of monitoring implementation, see Lottman, supra note 6, at 94.
' Chayes, supra note 12, at 1298-1301.
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This prolonged involvement on the part of the court does not guarantee
successful institutional reform. Even under the best circumstances, complex organizations are slow to change on their own, and judges have few
effective means of compelling these organizations to comply with court
orders.' 6 Although the right of the courts to continue their jurisdiction
and issue further orders in these cases is established in the law," the
means of supervising the implementation of court orders and translating
them into organizational practice are not thoroughly institutionalized.
Judges who issue "omnibus" decrees and assume the responsibility of
supervising the implementation of their orders must make certain choices
with the knowledge that no choice guarantees success and that there are
significant factors affecting implementation over which they have little
control. In considering how to proceed, judges have many options. They
range from the least intrusive, such as requiring routine reports from
defendant institutions, 8 to the most intrusive, such as the appointment
of receivers who may actually administer defendant organizations.'9
In choosing a method, a number of factors must be taken into account.
Sensitive to the tradition of judicial restraint, federal judges prefer the
less intrusive mechanism."0 However, nonintrusive methods are unlikely
to promote significant institutional change. Although it is only one factor
in the reform process and does not by itself account for institutional
reform, the effectiveness of judicial intervention seems to depend on the
vigor and the resources applied by the court to the task. Even when special
masters and commissions are established, unless members are given direct
access to the organizations and are backed by the determination of a judge
to superintend the implementation process, it seems that results fall short
of the intent of the court's orders.'
Possibly because of the courts' history of limited success in these cases
and because of reactions against the alleged activism of the courts, federal
judges recently have been increasingly reluctant to become involved in
the reform of social institutions. Some judges do continue to look for
solutions to the problem of balancing the capacity of the court to institute

6

E.g., Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker: SuperintendingStructural Change in

Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126
U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978); Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution, 18 J. Pus. L. 339 (1969).
" For a discussion of the similarities of institutional reform cases and more conventional cases in which courts have maintained their jurisdiction, see Eisenberg & Yeazell,
.supra note 3, at 467-88.
,8See Lottman, supra note 6, at 94.
" For a discussion of the development of the master and receiver in public law litigation, see Brakel, Special Master in InstitutionalLitigation, 1979 Am.B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 543.
See Special Project, supra note 8, at 924-26.
2 See Lottman, supra note 6, at 104; Note, supra note 8, at 447.
Kirp, supra note 5, at 120.

THE PARC DECREE

1982]

reform of social institutions with the principle that the operation of major
public institutions should not result in the maldistribution of social goods
to any class of citizens.2 The PARC case provides an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of a novel method of implementing a court decree
initiated by one judge in his attempt to resolve the problems associated
with the provision of an "appropriate" public education for retarded people by a major metropolitan school system.
PENNSYLVANIA ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED
24
CHILDREN V. PENNSYLVANIA
The suit brought by the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenged laws that effectively excluded severely retarded children from the public schools. 2 The
consent agreement ratified by the court in 1972 established that all mentally retarded children are capable of benefiting from an education. 26 It
mandated the provision of free public programs of instruction for all
retarded persons ages six through twenty-one appropriate to their learning capacities. ' It also required individualized evaluations and plans, 8
timely notification of decisions to parents, and due process procedures
by disinterested parties in the case of contested school decisions.2 The
decree stipulated that the state submit plans for identifying all previously excluded children and for educational programs including their range,
location, funding, and staffing.2 ' The orders specified timetables for compliance and provided for appointment of t ro masters with expertise in
the field of special education to oversee the implementation of the decree 2
and to hear members of the plaintiff class "who may be aggrieved by
the implementation of this order."' Finally, the court retained jurisdiction over the case until it heard the final report of the masters. 4 The
decree was the most elaborate statement of the educational rights of
retarded children issued to that date and was viewed as a major victory
The efforts of Judge Edward R. Becker in implementing the PARC decree are examples
of such attempts.
"' Field research on this case was conducted between January 1980 and August 1981.
Researchers interviewed school personnel, attorneys for the plaintiffs, and officers and
members of advocate groups. In addition, hearings were attended and documents pertaining to the case were reviewed. The information on the hearings was gathered by both
attendance and review of the docket, PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42 (E.D. Pa.).
PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 314.
2 Id. at 303.

Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Z Id.

at
at
at
at

314.
315.
314.
315.
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by advocates for handicapped children. Along with other case law, it
subsequently became the foundation for federal law with respect to the
rights of handicapped children.'
Theoretically, the decree should have had a better than average chance
of effectively guiding change in Pennsylvania's special education program.'
It was based on a relatively broad consensus among state officials,
educators, and advocates. As evidenced in other court decisions37 and
legislation such as the Education of All Handicapped Children Act,' there
seemed to be support in the American political community for its provisions. Ostensibly, the State was cooperating. It set up a Right to Education Office to help local school districts comply with state plans for the
location and education of the severely retarded and appointed local boards
called Local Task Forces to encourage communication between major consumer groups and local officials. 9 Timetables for implementation, which
subsequently proved unrealistic, were prescribed." Finally, experienced
masters established an oversight system. 1
Theoretically all of these conditions should have promoted the possibility
of orderly remediation; however, the process of educational reform in
Pennsylvania, most notably in Philadelphia, moved at a very slow pace.
During the first eighteen months the court orders were in force, the plaintiffs repeatedly petitioned the court for enforcement against the Commonwealth and the School District of Philadelphia.42 Although the court issued
subsequent orders43 to correct deficiencies with which the defendants
ostensibly complied, the final masters' report submitted in January 1974
' Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an

Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 986 (1977), reprintedin

CHANGING PATTERNS OF LAW

(W. Phillips & J. Rosenberg eds. 1980); Oberman, The Right to Educationfbr the Handicapped, 5 AMIcus 44 (1980).
The same point is made by Rebell, Implementation of Court Mandates ConcerningSpecial
Education: The Problems and the Potential, 10 J. L. & EDUC. 335, 339, (1981).
" E.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
20 U.S.C. SS 1411-20 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE, COMPILE: COMMONWEALTH PLAN FOR IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION AND EVALUATION OF MENTALLY RETARDED

CHILDREN 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMPILE].

PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
" Id. at 314.
42 Plaintiff Petition for Order of Reference, and Motion for Enforcement and Sanctions,
PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1972) (Doc. No. 112); Plaintiff's Motion
for Remedies for Noncompliance, id. (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1973) (Doc. No. 135).
" On August 3, 1972, the court ordered the school district of Philadelphia to bring itself
into compliance with the court order dated May 5, 1972, and to appear and present a plan
for identifying and locating excluded children. Id. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1972) (Doc. No. 115).
On October 5,1972, the court ordered the Commonwealth and the Philadelphia Board of
Education to meet for the purpose of jointly preparing a plan to provide education and
training to all retarded children. Id. (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 1972) (Doc. No. 115). On June 15,
1973, the court ordered the school district to prepare and implement a plan and amend
its budget to provide access, during the summer of 1973, to free public programs of education to retarded children. Id. (E.D. Pa. June 14, 1973) (Doc. No. 138).
4
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indicated that while some of the mandated procedural requirementssuch as the identification of previously excluded children-had been
accomplished and detailed programs had been planned, few substantive
had been made in the education provided to retarded
improvements
4
children.
Between February 1974, when the case was placed on the calendar of
Judge Becker, and October 1976, there was virtually no official action
on the case. Consequently in March 1977, plaintiff groups took action again.
The Philadelphia Association for Retarded Children (Philarc), claiming noncompliance on the part of the Commonwealth and the Philadelphia School
District, went back to court entering a motion for contempt (later
dropped),4" for enforcement of orders, sanctions, and other relief." At the
same time, a similar petition including a motion for compensatory damages
was entered by Marion and Leona Fialkowski on behalf of their retarded
sons." Their petition was joined by Advocates for the Developmentally
48
Disabled and the Police and Fire Association for Handicapped Children,
two advocacy groups based in Philadelphia whose members had a special
interest in the education of severely retarded children.
Pretrial hearings on these petitions were held in August 1977. During
the next fourteen months, Judge Becker attempted to negotiate a settlement among the parties. During these negotiations the list of participants
expanded as the judge sought information and made himself available
to hear the complaints of parents and other interested parties. The school
system appeared to -move slowly in complying with the court's orders
and the plaintiffs repeatedly complained of insufficient progress. Although
they pressed for a new trial, the judge convinced them temporarily to
forego adversarial proceedings and to continue to negotiate while
participating in public implementation hearings over which he would
preside.49 The informal sessions were to be conducted with all parties to
the litigation, plus any other interested persons who might choose to attend, with the proceedings becoming part of the case record. The purpose of the hearings would be to collect more information, to settle
disputes, and plan and monitor the efforts of the schools to establish appropriate educational programs.
"

Third and Final Report of the Court Appointed Masters, id.(E.D.Pa. Jan. 25, 1974)

(Doc. No. 143, at 14-15).

" Motion for a Finding of Contempt Against the School District of Philadelphia for
Enforcement of Orders, Sanctions, and Other Relief, id. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1977) (Doc. No. 152).
46Id.
11Petition of Walter and David Fialkowski for Enforcement of Orders and for Sanctions, id. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 1977) (Doc. No. 157).

4 Id. (E.D. Pa. June 7, 1977) (Doc. No. 173).
'9 Interview with Audrey Coccia, former member of the Board of Trustees, Philadelphia
Association for Retarded Citizens, one of the founders of Advocates for Developmentally
Disabled and Police and Fire Association for Handicapped Children, and Co-chair of the
Special Education Action Committee (SEAC), in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Apr. 16, 1981).
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In effect, Judge Becker was attempting to set up a system that would
substitute for further adversarial proceedings. If the parties could reach
new agreements, there would be no need for further orders. Based on
the history of other cases, further orders would have an uncertain effect.
Similarly, if the judge could bring community and judicial pressure to
bear on the defendants to put their house in order, it might be unnecessary
to impose sanctions for noncompliance. The court rarely has sufficient
means available to it for the enforcement of sanctions of this kind. The
first public hearing was held in January 1979, six and one-half years after
the court's ratification of the original decree. Those plaintiffs representing the most severely retarded tended to view the hearings as a further
delay in their efforts to insure the education of the handicapped children
in the Philadelphia schools and reluctantly consented to the hearing.'
The judge's decision to continue to preside over the negotiations was
unusual because federal judges are often reluctant to assume such responsibility in cases of institutional remediation. Aside from the considerations of judicial restraint related to such a step, courts lack the resources
to participate in disputes that may take years to resolve, and judges
usually are not expert in the institutional matters that come before them.
Conventionally in cases similar to the PARC case, judges have chosen
to appoint experienced masters or commissions to supervise the execution of their orders. These surrogates not only relieve the judge of the
continual burden of supervision, but they also provide a degree of protection against the politicization of judicial decision making, which may compromise the adjudicatory function of the court. Through protracted involvement a judge might develop an empathy with one of the parties
or become an advocate for a particular remedy. The result could be the
adoption of a political perspective that might endanger the distinction
between a judge's personal beliefs and an appropriate equitable remedy.
Theoretically, adjudicatory legitimacy depends on this distinction."
In reality, the adjudicatory and political components of the judicial role
are inseparable in cases involving the redistribution of resources in major institutions. Nonetheless, an obvious exaggeration of their overlap
could call into question the impartiality of subsequent orders.
Consequently, by making a commitment to continue his role in the negotiations, Judge Becker was taking a considerable risk. The move to a public
forum significantly heightened the risk of losing impartiality in the judicial
process by altering the nature of negotiations. School administrators who
normally plan and execute their policies under cover of bureaucratic invisibility had no choice but to expose some of their operations and the influence of special interests within the bureaucracy to public scrutiny.

Id.
Diver, supra note 16, at 104.
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Although the plaintiff groups had seemed united in their efforts to protect the rights of all children to a public education, differences in their
positions were revealed. Inevitably, each group tried to impress the court
and the public with justifications for its positions and actions. The politics
of the implementation process became a matter of public record and the
judge had to be continually on guard against becoming publicly identified
with the interests of any of the litigants.
By taking risks, Judge Becker theoretically added a new ingredient
to the usual process of implementation-that of a continuing judicial
presence. For several years he acted as his own master, an ombudsman,
and at times as the missing link, administering and coordinating the efforts
of groups involved in changing educational programs.
For more than two years prior to the termination of hearings in May
1981, the parties routinely conducted their negotiations to implement the
PARC decree in open court. This article will briefly describe the
organizaton of these unusual proceedings and address two major questions: first, did the hearings bring the litigants closer to an agreement
concerning the operational design for an "adequate" educational program
for mentally retarded students?' And second, to what extent were these
open court hearings an effective device for implementing and monitoring
the reform mandated by the PARC decree of special education in the
Philadelphia School District?
THE IMPLEMENTATION HEARINGS AS A
MEANS OF INSTITUTIONALIZING CONFLICT
In other areas of law involving the execution of judicial orders, there
are mature subjudicial institutions that oversee the proceedings. 3 This
was not the case here. In the absence of clear guidelines, several issues
had to be handled simultaneously before any substantive matters could
be addressed. The parameters of the judge's role had to be established.
Rules pertaining to participation, procedure, and the use of information
presented to the court had to be determined. In short, institutional
arrangements had to be made that would protect the rights of the parties while promoting their cooperative efforts. The final form of these
The Petition of the Philadelphia Association for Retarded Citizens, Petition for a Finding of Contempt Against the School District of Philadelphia, PARC v. Pennsylvania, No.
71-42, (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 1977) (Doc. No. 152), and the Petition of Fialkowski, id. (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 17, 1977) (Doc. No. 157), and later the Petitions of Fialkowski and the Philadelphia
Police and Fire Association for Handicapped Children, Memorandum in Support, id. (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 15, 1979) (Doc. No. 239), stressed dereliction in the planning and implementation
of an adequate education. During the pretrial hearings in August 1977, expert testimony
was primarily addressed to matters bearing on the definition, implementation, and quality
of an adequate education. Id. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 1977) (Doc. Nos. 199-201); id. (E.D. Pa. Oct.

3, 1977) (Doc. Nos. 205-206, 208-209).
'

Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 315.
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arrangements would affect the quality and the quantity of agreements
concerning remedial actions. What proceeded was a time-consuming and
delicate process of institution building from which any of the litigants
might have withdrawn, since they were participating voluntarily, had their
interests not been taken into account or their rights not protected by
procedural safeguards. The withdrawal of any litigant might have required
the judge to schedule the matter for trial, a step which he evidently considered premature and was reluctant to take.
Participation:Formal and Informal Roles
In educational reform of the magnitude involved in the PARC case,
there are always nonparty players, such as community and professional
groups, which have a stake in the outcome of the litigation, but no formal
standing in the courtroom.' Although the interests of such groups might
represent constraints on the ability of an organization to plan remedial
programs or otherwise comply with court orders,5 their interests are
rarely taken into account in the policy process.-' Several studies support
the proposition that because the agreement of persons in the delivery
systems of bureaucracies are requisite to successful policy implementation, failure to include them in the policy process decreases the probability of effective organizational change.5 After four years of involvement,
Judge Becker understood the important role such groups play in the
change process and created formal arrangements to insure their representation in the deliberations.
In November 1978, prior to the first public hearing, he issued an order
creating the Special Education Action Committee (SEAC) to function as
an ombudsman, to serve as a link between the community and the schools,
to hear, document, and report complaints to the court, and to be a model
for a permanent advisory committee. SEAC was composed of representatives of the plaintiff class, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the
School District of Philadelphia. The following were also given seats on
the committee: a representative of the Philadelphia Chapter of the
Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers, whose petition to enter the case
as a neutral party had been granted in 19 7 7 ;1' a member of the Philadelphia
Association of School Administrators (PASA), which is a professional
' Diver, supra note 16, at 75-76.
5s See J. HANDLER, supra note 6; D. HOROWITZ,

supranote 6. Both provide full accounts

of structural and political factors associated with the avoidance and transformation of court
ordered remediation policies in defendant organizations.
' E.g., Weatherly & Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation:
Implementing Special Education Reform, 47 HARV. EDUc. REV. 171 (1977).
5' E.g., J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 94-110 (1973); Elmore, Organizational Models of Social ProgramImplementation, 26 PUB. POL. 215 (1978); Weatherly & Lipsky,
supra note 56.
1 Order granting motion of Philadelphia Federation of Teachers to intervene. PARC
v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1977) (Doc. No. 198).
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association and semiofficial bargaining agent for principals and other line
administrators in the school district; representatives of community groups
with well-established interests in special education reform; a member of
the black community; and a member of the Philadelphia Local Task Force.
The latter was the local committee composed of educational professionals
and citizens created under the Pennsylvania Plan to identify and enroll
children previously excluded from the public schools.59 Even though the
Philadelphia Local Task Force had a long history of conflict with school
officials and considered the creation of SEAC a threat to its authority,
they nonetheless joined the committee. SEAC was co-chaired by a
representative of the plaintiffs and by a representative of the defendant
school district.
Given the diversity of interests represented at the hearings, it was
inevitable that the negotiations would be complex, time consuming, and
subject to political maneuvering by the parties. Resolution of issues requiring sharing of authority or redistribution of function, or a compromise
of divergent interests, could be limited by the multiple perspectives formally represented. Nevertheless, once SEAC established routines for
operation acceptable to its members, it functioned to reduce the scope,
if not the intensity, of conflict between the schools and the plaintiffs and,
for a time, to contain the disputes within the framework of the hearings.
In addition to providing for broad representation by creating these
quasi-official roles, the judge provided for less formal public participation by other persons. A part of each session was set aside to hear the
complaints and opinions of parents. Following the airing of complaints,
the judge often asked school officials present in the courtroom to meet
with parents immediately. The procedure served several important functions. First, it provided a public forum in which individual needs could
be publicly expressed. This made information available to the court and
sensitized the participants to the human problems involved in the continued bureaucratic delay. Second, because the complaints were heard
publicly, school officials had to address certain individual problems even
before systematic school reforms could be accomplished. And third,
because parents were able to talk directly to high-level school officials
whom they perceived to be otherwise inaccessible, the sessions acted as
a safety valve. If individual parents had been consistently ignored and
denied access to the proceedings, new court actions might have been initiated, bringing additional pressure on the court to abandon its efforts
to reach a negotiated settlement.
Establishing Rules of Procedure
Before the hearings could begin, it was necessary to reach an agree' COMPILE, supra note

39.
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ment on the rules of procedure to protect the rights and the interests
of the litigants. Two types of rules were of critical importance: those
governing the use of information and those specifying the functions of
the judge and other participants. As to the former, defendants' attorneys
were concerned with the kinds of information being presented to the court
and the use of such information in future litigation. The issue arose because
transcripts of the hearings were to become a part of the court record.
However, strict adherence to the rule of evidence and the traditional scope
of cross-examination of witnesses would have been inappropriate given
the purpose of the implementation hearings. To guarantee that the right
to exclude testimony on the basis of hearsay or lack of relevance would
not be compromised, the judge and the parties agreed that the transcripts
would be inadmissible as evidence in any ensuing contempt or enforcement proceeding."
Just as the rights of the parties might have been injured in future litigation without this guarantee, their rights might have been abridged by
the uncontrolled expansion of judicial power. Although there was virtually
no overt resistance from the litigants to the judge's performance of some
administrative tasks, they blocked his efforts to transfer power to other
participants. For example, when Judge Becker suggested that SEAC
assume the responsibility for monitoring school programs, a function
generally understood by the parties to be reserved to the judge and the
Commonwealth through the Local Task Force, lawyers for both sides objected. It may be that the plaintiffs were concerned that this would put
school officials who were members of SEAC in the position of monitoring
their own programs, thereby diminishing the possibility of an objective
evaluation. On the other hand, defendants could have been wary of giving the plaintiff members of SEAC the opportunity for direct entry to
school facilities. Jointly, the lawyers argued that the order creating SEAC
and describing its functions did not assign a monitoring role to that
committee. It was their view that Judge Becker's attempt to assign that
function to SEAC was, in effect, an abrogation of an agreement by the
parties." This episode and others of a similar nature put the judge on
notice that he could not arbitrarily change the rules governing the
hearings.
While the attorneys were successful in limiting the powers reserved
to the judge, he, in turn, tried to make certain that no party would
dominate the proceedings. The PARC decree had given a degree of power
to the representatives of the handicapped by mandating institutional
remedies and by guaranteeing them continued access to the court. Parents
and advocate groups, however, were clearly less powerful and had fewer
' Transcript of Implementation Hearing, PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 1, 1979) (Doe. No. 237, at 68-69).
" Transcript of Implementation Hearing, id. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 1979) (Doc. No. 213, at 68-73).
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resources than school administrators, who were still in control of the daily
operation of the schools. Thus, it was necessary that the roles of participants be structured with a view to correcting the imbalance and equalizing their positions. Therefore, when representatives of the advocate
groups complained to the judge that the school district's representatives
on SEAC were attempting to control the committee by releasing publicity
that the plaintiffs felt was misleading and by editing reports sent to the
court, he directed that the operating and reporting procedures to which
the advocates objected be suspended."
Judge Becker carefully orchestrated the courtroom proceedings. At
times he protected school officials from charges of dissembling and evasion.
However, when they openly failed to comply with his directives or when
promised remedial action was excessively delayed, he threatened to cancel
the hearings and schedule the case for trial. Using a variety of tactics
including an appeal to reason, threat, persuasion, and direct instruction,
the judge negotiated with the parties to produce a set of rules that would
protect their rights, balance their powers, and maintain a level of discourse
that would not disrupt the working relationship necessary for the continuation of cooperative planning and negotiations.
Setting the Agenda: Defining the Issues
One way to understand what was accomplished during the hearings
is to examine the agenda. Setting an agenda is an important element in
institutionalizing conflict. It not only reflects the nature of the issues that
will be discussed and acted upon, and the plans that are likely to be made,
but also determines whose interests will be served in a set of negotiations. Agendas have political implications.'
Although thirty-five distinct issues were raised at the hearings, only
seven were the subject of substantial discussion. These issues, in order
of frequency of appearance and duration of discussion, are: first, the
transportation system that takes handicapped children to and from school;
second, the role and responsibility of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's
Department of Education in implementing the PARC decree; third, the
telephone "Hotline" maintained by SEAC as a clearinghouse for parents'
and school personnel's complaints and questions regarding the school
district's special education programs and facilities; fourth, the role and
functions of SEAC, especially in relation to the functions of the Local
Task Force and also in relation to the school district's special education
department; fifth, sensitivity training programs aimed at preparing principals, teachers, and nonhandicapped students for the introduction of handi-

Id. at 1-10.
, E.g., Diver, supra note 16, at 83-84.
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capped students into the schools; sixth, "needs" surveys aimed at determining parents' and school personnel's perceptions of the extent and kinds
of programs required in the schools; and seventh, the school district's
curriculum plans, especially the "life skills" program. The curriculum plans
were rarely discussed or debated. They were simply presented by school
district officials, but were occasionally attacked as paper plans with no
practical effect.
These issues fall into two distinguishable, though not absolutely
separable, categories. The first consists of issues concerned with the
logistics involved in introducing retarded children into the schools. The
second involves issues concerning the distribution of power related to
monitoring and shaping school policy.
Issues in the first category are concerned primarily with procedural
matters rather than with the curriculum and staffing of educational programs. Because resolution of such problems requires change in organizational procedures, but few normative agreements concerning staff functions and responsibilities or the substance of educational programs, and
because they have relatively little to do with the rights and prerogatives
of the parties involved, they tend to be amenable to solution. Further,
their progress can be measured in quantitative terms. Even adversaries
are more likely to agree about the success or failure of a given procedure.'
In contrast, issues of the second type involve questions concerning the
distribution of authority, the permeability of institutional boundaries, and
the distribution of duties relative to school reform. These issues were
not as easily resolved and were the subjects of protracted debate. These
debates were of two types: one involved the responsibilities of each of
the defendants and the other the distribution of authority among the
parties -especially regarding the relative roles of SEAC and the Local
Task Force.
As an example, unresolved conflict existed between the judge and the
Pennsylvania Department of Education regarding the extent to which the
State was to be responsible for monitoring the programs of local school
districts. The State Secretary of Education has not been as vigorous in
his support of special educational programming as was his predecessor,
who was a party to the negotiations that resulted in the original PARC
decree. In fact, the current secretary has lobbied in Washington to limit
the scope of such programs and recently proposed new reduced funding
formulas that would allow local districts greater discretion to allocate
special education funds." The secretary defined the State's role primarily
64 The relative ease with which procedural or administrative issues can be resolved in
contrast to substantive issues has been widely remarked, and is illustrated in case materials.
See J. HANDLER, supra note 6, at 166-67; D. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 106-70. Improvement
in administrative procedures rarely affords a consensus of opinion as to the achievement
of qualitative improvement in the delivery of services or treatment.

65

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PROPOSED TWO YEAR PLAN FOR SPECIAL

EDUCATION 1-5 (1981).
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as that of a resource and information center and insisted that there was
insufficient support in the legislature to justify the expansion of the State's
function. Judge Becker took the position that the decree required the
involvement of the State in monitoring and coordinating programs in local
school districts.66 The views of the court and the Commonwealth were
apparently irreconcilable. The State, despite the court's orders, has insisted on its position and the court had no readily available means to
compel the Pennsylvania Department of Education to change its policy.
Under these circumstances, even a contempt citation would have had little
impact.
While there was agreement among State and city officials concerning
the State's nonintrusive policy, State and city officials have been engaged
in a battle over the alleged failure of the State Department of Education
to meet its financial commitment for special education in Philadelphia.
The Philadelphia School District is currently suing the department; in
the original suit, the school district claimed that the department defaulted
on its obligation to pay $34 million to the district for special education
programs. Without these funds the city argues that it cannot meet the
requirements prescribed in the decree and related legislation. The issues
of funding and interorganizational conflict that are rooted in the broader
political controversy concerning the control of the schools often cannot
be resolved in the courtroom. Nevertheless, these issues affect the process of organizational reform over which the court has jurisdiction.
In addition to the controversies involved in intergovernmental relations,
the debate continued among members of SEAC. Their differences seemed
to center on several issues. First, as noted by Diver in suits such as this,
there is often competition among the advocacy groups over who will represent the plaintiff class in the negotiations."' Philarc is an established
organization with a strong position in the community. Advocates for the
Developmentally Disabled and the Police and Fire Association for
Handicapped Children are less established groups that generally represent
the more severely retarded, a somewhat different and narrower
constituency with special concerns relative to institutional reform. Adding to the difficulties in reaching an agreement, the Local Task Force
argued that SEAC had usurped its functions.
Second, in addition to the political conflict among the advocates,
intracommittee relations were complicated by the protective strategies
of school officials concerned with the encroachment of nonexpert citizen
groups on professional territory. School officials guarded against the intrusion of citizen groups and monitoring by outside experts hired by the
plaintiffs, who were viewed as agents of the opposition rather than

' Transcript of Implementation Hearing, PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa.
June 13, 1979) (Doe. No. 220, at 54, 56-59); id. (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1979) (Doe No. 237, at 73, 95-96).
' See generally Diver, supra note 16.
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disinterested evaluators. In fact, the officials resisted all routine monitoring of the system.
These controversies concerning representation and authority were
ongoing and unavoidable. They could not be easily resolved unless principles defining the rights and duties of the parties had been clearly spelled
out in law and institutionalized in practice. Even then the nature of these
controversies precluded stable resolutions. The issues had to be settled
relative to each policy decision. This is an aspect of the political process
accompanying organizational reform that occupied both the attention and
the time of the parties during negotiation and resulted in delay of decree
implementation.
If procedural and political issues remained the focus of negotiation
throughout the hearings, what was not considered? Agendas are important not only because of what they include, but also because of what they
exclude. Topics not routinely considered included the appropriateness of
individualized educational plans, classroom placements, the quality of programs, and the obligation of the school district to provide educationally
related services such as physical and occupational therapy. These were
core issues relating to the quality and the breadth of educational programs to be provided to meet the "appropriate education" stipulation of
the decree." Early in the hearings it became apparent that the district
did not have orderly procedures for transporting and evaluating mentally
retarded students or for training teachers and staff to provide suitable
instruction. In a statement delivered at the second public hearing, the
judge instructed school administrators to give priority to improving the
system in these areas." Itwas his view that without resolving these critical
procedural problems, the schools would be unable to accommodate retarded students. 0
Because technical and procedural problems were high on the list of
issues to be addressed, and because Judge Becker asserted that the resolution of individual problems was contingent on positive developments in
these areas, questions of the quality of education were temporarily deferred. Inevitably, such issues did arise because they were of major
concern to the plaintiffs. When they were discussed, the degree of
disagreement among the parties concerning the quality of programs in
place, and their inability to agree on standards by which to judge the
adequacy of these programs, generated unresolved debate.
In sum, conflict between the parties was controlled by structuring an
agenda that focused on either procedural issues that lent themselves to
measurable progress because there were fewer disagreements or

PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 285, 288, 302, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
" PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1979) (Doc. No. 237, at 55-58).
70
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generalized and unavoidable debates concerning the proper degree of
authority and responsibility of the parties. Issues concerning the quality
or evaluation of educational programs available to retarded students in
the Philadelphia schools were avoided as long as possible.
Negotiations: Conflict Resolution and Oversight
The implementation hearings ended in June 1981. Progress has been
made on logistical issues concerned with the preparation of the school
system for the inclusion of handicapped children. Despite flaws, the bus
system now operates in a reasonable way, the Hotline has led to the resolution of many parents' complaints, sensitivity programs have been established, retarded children have been identified and placed in classrooms, and,
in most cases, individual educational plans have been written, albeit not
without certain difficulties. 1 The hearings resulted in a narrowing of the
scope of conflict as these procedural problems were resolved. Further,
the intensity of the conflict was somewhat diminished as routines were
established for dispute resolution. The hearings, however, were not an
effective means of resolving many of the core issues. Resolution of these
issues would have required a fundamental shift in the conflicting perspectives of the parties. This shift has not occurred because, to a large extent, these conflicting perspectives are inherent in the differing positions
of the parties to the case.
School officials view themselves as experts and professionals with the
training and authority to determine eduational policy. Parents and others
representing retarded children see themselves as naturally qualified to
know what is best for their children. These differing views, based on
distinct roles with competing claims to authority, cannot be easily
compromised.
School officials, by definition, are concerned with devising and delivering classes of services to categories of children. Their orientation is universalistic and general. Parents, on the other hand, are concerned with the
particular needs of their children regardless of whether the system is
able to meet those needs in any precise way and still provide an adequate
education for thousands of others.
School district officials, almost of necessity, operate within a complex
bureaucratic context with widely dispersed and interconnected centers
of power. Significant changes in services such as the ones involved in
"' The types of reform accomplished during the period of the hearings are similar to
those initiated early in the remedial process. Final Masters Report, id. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25,
1974) (Doc. No. 143, at 14-15). In an evaluation of reform processes in special education,
Kirp, Buss, and Kuriloff find that administrative procedures unlikely to require reshaping
of educational programs will be put into effect with relatively little resistance. Kirp, Buss
& Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1974), reprinted in CHANGING PATTERNS OF LAW (W. Phillips & J. Rosenberg eds. 1980).
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this case cannot be accomplished without disruptive reverberations within
the system. Change is, therefore, likely to be slow, problematic, and
difficult to achieve. From the perspective of parent and other groups,
school district programs will frequently appear to be halfhearted at best
and intentionally evasive at worst.
Finally, parents can afford to think about ideal educational programs
unconstrained by budgetary and other external considerations. School
officials, especially in the present case, must develop programs within
a restricted monetary environment aggravated by demands of competing
groups within the educational system and within a political environment
in which the claims of the handicapped may be viewed with indifference
and, sometimes, hostility. Each point of view was represented on SEAC.
Added to these differences in the perspectives of the litigants were those
of other groups such as the Philadelphia Chapters of the American Federation of Teachers and the Pennsylvania Association of School
Administrators. The representatives of these groups were unwilling to
consider changes perceived to be antithetical to their interests or to allow
their prerogatives to become the subject of negotiation. The judge
legitimated their interests by providing the teachers' union and the
association of school administrators with formal roles in the proceedings
from which those interests could be articulated and defended. 2
Consequently, the agenda consisted of a relatively narrow range of topics
on which progress appeared possible. Arguments over political domain
continued to influence even seemingly routine procedures initiated by
SEAC.
It has been suggested that one of the significant problems in the policy
implementation process is that officials charged with the translation of
policy into practice are rarely consulted at the design stage. Theoretically,
then, the inclusion of those who are to implement policy in the planning
process should result in policies that are more likely to be successfully
' In the motion filed by the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers to Intervene, PARC
v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 1977) (Doc. No. 164), the petitioners argued
that their members had responsibility for aspects of decree implementation; that their activities relative to professional responsibilities were subjects of contractual agreement; that
should the specification of the motions of plaintiffs be granted, the board of education and
the school district would be displaced as the agency responsible for the provision of special
educational services; that the appointment of special masters would disturb the distribution of responsibilities existing in the organization; and that the appointment would create
a clear and potential conflict with collective bargaining agreements in effect. They cited
conflict in procedures for evaluating children as mandated and as agreed upon in their
contracts. In granting the motion, Judge Becker acknowledged that contracts between the
union and the Philadelphia School District involved mandated activities and that the court
has an interest in the impact of remedial orders on contractual relations. The court agreed
that neutral intervention was appropriate because neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants
could adequately represent the union's interest. Bench Opinion, id. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1977)
(Doc. No. 203).
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operationalized.73 In fact, in the reform of special education, research
suggests that grass roots participation in planning is related to effective
program change." On the other hand, it also appears that when
bureaucratic personnel participate directly in the design of change, the
constraints normally associated with bureaucratic resistance to innovation may intrude upon and become part of that design. 5 To a significant
extent, this occurred during the PARC hearings. As the hearings progressed, it seemed that negotiations tended to focus on what the participants believed were possible changes, with "possible" defined by the
political and organizational constraints imposed by the more powerful participants. Possibilities, not rights and duties, which are the focus of judicial
concern, took precedence and affected both the substance of agreements
and the rate and nature of organizational adaptation. To the extent that
groups associated with school bureaucracy and with the Commonwealth
were sufficiently powerful to limit or to foreclose policy options, to shape
the agenda of the hearings, and to seek coalitions with others of similar
mind on particular issues, the negotiations resembled a legislative process rather than a conference of equals whose mission was to find ways
to comply with the court decree.
As some members of the plaintiff class were quick to realize, for those
of lesser power, negotiations are not a reasonable substitute for adjudication. To be effective in a quasi-legislative process, each party should have
roughly the same degree of power. Each must control real or symbolic
resources needed by others in order to effect compromise. Though the
PARC decree and federal law affirmed the plaintiffs' rights to an
appropriate education, they had insufficient power to force school and
Commonwealth officials to consider seriously many of the issues they
thought were critical to the implementation of the decree without further judicial orders. In addition, plaintiff groups dependent upon
volunteers could not match the resources of the school, whose professional
staff reported to the court. The plaintiffs had limited personnel to review
" Berman, The Study of Macro and Micro Implementation, 26 PuB. POL. 160 (1978); Van
Meter & Van Horn, The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 AD.
& Soc. 445 (1975); Weatherly & Lipsky, supra note 56, at 171-97.
"' Upon reviewing the literature identifying factors facilitating policy implementation,
Elmore concludes:
The only implementation that makes sense under these conditions is one
that emphasizes consensus building and accommodation between policy makers
and implementors. . . . Policy does not exist in any concrete sense until
implementors have shaped it and claimed it for their own: the result is

consensus reflecting the initial intent of policy makers and the independent
judgment of implementors.
Elmore, supra note 57, at 216.
" For discussions of the effects of multiple participants and perspectives on the policy
process, see E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 56 (1977); J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY,
supra note 57, at 94.
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and validate records. Although the Philadelphia chapter of PARC made
personnel and facilities available and although the volunteers from the
other advocacy groups involved were sufficiently sophisticated to challenge
the school administrators when their reports were obviously biased, the
prolongation of the hearings strained the collective resources of the plaintiffs. Further, though the plaintiffs could challenge the schools through
court action and make public their dissatisfaction with the performance
of the Philadelphia School District, as individuals, having no options for
alternative education for their children, they remained dependent on their
adversaries. This dependency made their position inherently weak. 6
Originally, the hearings were to have a dual purpose: to provide a
mechanism for reaching new agreements among the parties and to provide a means of monitoring the progress of the school district in its efforts
to comply with the decree. As a monitoring device, the hearings were
no more effective than the masters' hearings had been. The judge was
able to supervise the implementation of some detailed procedures such
as the development of a reasonably efficient transportation system for
retarded children and the routines for bringing the complaints of parents
to the attention of school personnel in a systematic way. However, an
effective technique for evaluating the quality of the programs was never
established. From the start of hearings, the plaintiffs insisted that the
judge retain the authority to monitor the schools." The judge was carrying a full caseload and had made no provision for surrogates to have direct
access to school sites. His schedule permitted only one visit to selected
schools during the two years of hearings. Aside from unverified information presented directly by school administrators to the court and the
reports of SEAC, which were often challenged on the basis of bias,"9 the
court had no arrangements for the routine collection of information by
disinterested parties. The plaintiffs did not have the resources to collect
information independently, nor were they provided with regular access
to classrooms for monitoring purposes. The Commonwealth, despite the
urging of the court, consistently refused to monitor district schools
directly79 and the Local Task Force, which unofficially had performed
monitoring functions prior to the creation of SEAC, was virtually inactive
in this respect during the period covered by the hearings.
The Development of Different Strategies Among the Plaintiffs
In addition to the structure of the proceedings, other factors affected
,' For the effect of dependency relations on court mandated institutional remediation,
see Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 511-12.
" Transcript of Implementation Hearing, PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 2, 1979) (Doc. No. 213, at 68-73).
"6See, e.g., id. at 6-9.
71 Id.
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1979) (Doc. No. 217, at 61-65); id. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 1979) (Doc.
No. 218, at 75-80); id. (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1979) (Doc. No. 220, at 75-76).
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the outcome. These negotiations lasted in one form or another for more
than three years, in contrast to most litigation, which is of shorter
duration. Consequently, unpredictable developments were more likely to
affect the negotiations. Two such developments were particularly
important. First, the decline in fiscal support for programs for the handicapped by the State80 provided a credible excuse for the inability of officials to fulfill their obligatons under the decree and fueled arguments
against the expansion of supportive services to the mentally retarded."
Second, during the course of the proceedings, Philarc, the largest and
best established of the plaintiff groups, began to change its strategies.
For several years, its professional leadership had been giving top priority to devising systemwide procedures that would facilitate the incorporation of all mentally retarded children into the schools and to delivering
of a broad range of services to the community rather than concentrating
on advocacy and litigation.82 Having assigned priorities to these services,
the Philarc leaders believed it to be in their interest to work cooperatively
through SEAC and in direct consultation with school administrators to
streamline the transportation system, to routinize complaint procedures,
and to educate the parents of mentally retarded children. Eventually,
Philarc developed contractual relations with the Philadelphia schools,
working as consultants on the design of several of these programs. At
the same time, in separate sessions, Philarc's lawyers worked to achieve
an agreement with the schools concerning curricula and programs for
educable and trainable mentally retarded students.
The professional leadership of Philarc viewed school reform as a difficult,
incremental process and, given the political and fiscal realities, they had
reason to believe that a cooperative approach would have positive results.'
Through litigation they had achieved success in getting retarded children
into the schools. To a limited extent, they influenced programs, established
relationships with school administrators, and developed both direct and
informal access to the system. Although they continued to challenge the
efficacy of specific programs, they were, nevertheless, satisfied that some
problems were being resolved in a way that would eventually provide
a better, if not ideal, education for the majority of retarded children.
From the point of view of the school district, the relatively conciliatory
position taken by Philarc was an asset for several reasons. Philarc had
See note 65 & accompanying text, supra.
For differing views among the parties concerning the relationship of funding and implementation of PARC, see PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa. June 13, 1979) (Doc.
No. 220, at 56-58). The defendants argue that the expansion and full range of offerings
mandated are not possible given the shrinkage of funds, while the plaintiffs counter that
in the long run the delivery of services will be economical and that reform is blocked for
noneconomic reasons. Id.
I2Interview with Erman-Anthony Gentile, Executive Director, Philadelphia Association
for Retarded Citizens, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Apr. 14, 1981).
1 Interview with Caryl Oberman of the Education Law Center, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Apr. 21, 1981).
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experience and personnel who could assist the district with special tasks.
By contracting with them for programs such as sensitivity training for
parents and methods for resolving organizational problems, the district
got the benefit of their expertise, and, at the same time, was able to
demonstrate to the court and the public its willingness to cooperate with
former adversaries. As a result, in addition to assistance with the development of important programs that were not involved with the direct education of the children, but with peripheral matters, cooperation with the
advocacy group had a symbolic payoff.
Other members of the plaintiff class, including the Fialkowskis, the Advocates for the Developmentally Disabled, and the Police and Fire Association for Handicapped Children, were following a different course. About
one year after the initiation of the implementation hearings, these groups,
which generally represented the most severely impaired children, convinced that the negotiations would not result in significant reform, withdrew
their members from SEAC. They insisted that the judge consider their
petition requesting enforcement and further orders to specify the responsibilities of both the Commonwealth and the Philadelphia schools and to
establish standards for evaluating the system. Philarc did not join in this
action. However, acknowledging the rights of the other plaintiffs, Judge
Becker finally dissolved SEAC and ended the implementation hearings
as of June 8, 1981, the date the trial began. Although the petitioners
presented their case, the cases of the school district and of the
Pennsylvania Department of Education were never presented. The parties entered into lengthy negotiations which resulted in a settlement agreement of all individual and class claims on May 14, 1982."
The split within the ranks of the plaintiffs regarding legal and political
strategy is likely to affect the implementation of the new agreement between a subclass of the plaintiffs and the defendants. At present a major
and relatively powerful adversary is temporarily willing to accede to a
slow pace of change. This relaxation of pressure may influence the process of implementing the new stipulations. The order is complex and likely to be costly, yet compliance will be of most immediate relevance to
the smaller and poorer community groups that speak for the least
prepossessing members of the original class. Disadvantaged groups such
as these, whose constituency has only tenuous public support and whose
legitimate claims are only reluctantly acknowledged by the community,
are extraordinarily dependent on the courts for the vindication of their
rights,85 yet the courts' ability to secure these rights is limited.
CONCLUSION: THE COURTS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
As to the effectiveness of the hearings, evaluations differ. The outcome

'

PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42, (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1982) (Doc. No. 312, at 3).
See generally Diver, supra note 16, at 67-70.
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of negotiation is generally judged from the perspective of each party.86
From the point of view of Philarc the hearings are viewed as having been
moderately successful.l The organization has used the hearings to develop
working relationships with school officials with whom it now shares, to
some extent, a common expectation regarding the reform process. As
Philare sees it, continued negotiations with the schools, rather than litigation, will be of greater advantage to retarded children.88 School officials,
though often pressured by the court, used the hearings and court directives as leverage with their superiors in the school district to demand
action on the improvement of special education. 9 Further, they were able
to avoid litigation for several years and so have gained time for the school
district to implement some of the administrative procedures mandated
in the decree. Objectively, it is not possible to judge whether these procedures would have been developed in the absence of the hearings.
From the point of view of those plaintiff groups that went back to court,
the hearings are considered unsuccessful. In their view, throughout the
negotiations school officials were able to avoid making critical decisions
related to the content and the quality of educational programs for retarded
students. Consequently, some of the advocates viewed the lengthy negotiations as a means of delaying the remediation process and as a subversion
of their clients' rights.9 ' As early as May 1980, a year before he ended
the hearings, the judge, too, wondered whether the process was inadvertently working to the disadvantage of individual plaintiffs. 2
As with other modes of court intervention, neither prolonged negotiation with direct judicial involvement nor the pressures created by public
scrutiny have been sufficient to resolve, to the satisfaction of the parties,
the complex issues involved with the substantive reform of special education in the Philadelphia School District.
Philarc continues to negotiate with the school district to reach accord
on substantive issues involved in the education of educable and trainable
mentally retarded students. As indicated earlier, the suit of the
Fialkowskis, the Advocates for the Developmentally Disabled, and the
Police and Fire Association, which represent most severely retarded
children, has been settled." This settlement agreement includes detailed
stipulations for development of curricula and their introduction into all
Elmore, supra note 57, at 218.

Interview with James C. Everett, Attorney for the Philadelphia Association for Retarded Citizens, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (June 2, 1981).
SId.

Interview with an Administrator in the Department of Special Education, School District
of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (July 8, 1980).
" Rebell reports that under the supervision of a special master, New York City has
made significant improvements in procedures related to special education programs. Rebell,

supra note 36, at 352.
",Interview with Audrey Coccia, .upra note 49.
' PARC v. Pennsylvania, No. 71-42. (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1980) (Doc. No. 262, at 58).
Id. (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1982) (Doc. No. 312).
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schools, provision of support services, institutionalization of inservice training for school personnel, evaluation procedures, internal coordination of
programs, systematic monitoring by the Local Task Force, parent training, creation of a professional advisory group, and designated deadlines
for implementation and the delivery of plans and progress reports to the
court." In addition, specific budget commitments have been agreed to
by the state,95 and the court has retained jurisdiction over the case for
the purpose of enforcement for three years from the date of the court's
approval of the agreement.' As the judge anticipated, an agreement which
might effectively redress the grievances of the plaintiffs would, of
necessity, have to be comprehensive. 7 New provisions have been made
for internal administrative coordination, the appointment of a project
administrator to supervise all developments, and the assignment of programmatic and procedural responsibilities to designated school personnel.
It is possible, given the explicit detail in the new agreement and the apparent willingness of the defendants to agree to a broad range of program and organizational change, that the new plans will be expeditiously
formulated and implemented. This can only be determined in the future.
At present, as a result of the settlement and continuing negotiations
between Philarc and the defendants, the court is less involved in the implementation process than it has been during the past five years. However,
given the far reaching reforms called for in the new agreement and the
fact that reasonable people may disagree with the definition of terms such
as "state of the art and all necessary teaching-learning resources and coordination for the free appropriate education of severely handicapped
students,"" the parties may have to appeal to the court for further
clarification in the future. If they do, the court will have to determine
whether the plaintiff class should seek relief through repeated court action, whether to urge the reinstitutionalization of hearings, whether to
appoint masters or other surrogates to administer the settlement, or
whether to take even more forceful steps. Tradition suggests that it is
unlikely that an extremely intrusive mode of oversight would be chosen.
Yet given the relative weakness of the plaintiff class as presently constituted, a less intrusive means of supervising implementation may not
be notably successful.1" As willing as Judge Becker has been to participate
in the reform of the Philadelphia public schools to insure the rights of
handicapped children, public hearings, lengthy negotiations and the
" Id. at 5-20.
""Id. at 19-20.
' Id. at 22.
97 Id. (E.D. Pa. June 13, 1979) (Doec. No. 220, at 87-92); id. (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1979) (Doc.
No. 237, at 63).
Id. (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1982) (Doc. No. 312, at 7-22).
Id. at 5.
See Special Project, supra note 8, at 927.
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pressure of formal complaint and trial proceedings have been necessary
to affect progress toward the achievement of goals outlined in the original
decree adopted by the court more than ten years ago. This is because
the problems involved in school reform are essentially political, and for
courts to be effective in this setting, they need more influence over powerful interest groups within state and school district bureaucracies. The
courts need more power to secure and dictate the distribution of funds
and the capacity to punish nonconformity with their orders in ways that
would pose a real threat to recalcitrant officials. In short, the courts will
have to function in a manner incompatible with the role of the judiciary
in the United States' form of government.' °'
As presently constituted, the courts have been a powerful force in
establishing the rights of special groups. Their actions during the past
several decades have had significant moral and social effects. It has also
been suggested that in assessing the institutional impact of court ordered
reform, one should attend to the cumulative effects of cases brought in
the cause of distributive justice, rather than to the history of any one
case.' 2 While this observation is valid, and while this case study suggests
that the courts may be able to force institutions to comply with the letter of the law, or encourage the parties to reach formal settlements reflecting the intent of court orders, this study also suggests that, unless government officials, elite groups within the bureaucracy, and the public vigorously support institutional change, the courts can have only limited success in altering the operating philosophies and organizational practices
that finally determine the quality of service and treatment provided to
disadvantaged classes.
101D. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 298.
'"

See Rebell, supra note 36, at 355.

